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1. Introduction 
A vast number of workers in developing economies find employment opportunities 
outside of the formal sector in activities such as self-employment, household enterprises 
and small businesses.1 While the informal sector may provide short-run labor market 
flexibility, it is also associated with higher poverty and inequality, plus lower tax revenues, 
productivity, wages, and job security. 2  Formally registered firms provide better 
employment opportunities through formal labor contracts, statutory minimum wages and 
other workplace regulations, but they may not grow fast enough to absorb a growing 
supply of new workers in economies with high population growth (La Porta and Shleifer 
(2014). One strategy to spur strong growth in formal employment opportunities for 
unskilled workers and curb the expansion of informal employment is to facilitate growth 
in export industries.3 Understanding the employment effects of trade is a key question in 
economic development, but there is surprisingly little systematic assessment of how trade 
affects employment in the formal and informal sectors in developing economies.4 
In this paper, we seek to examine an impact of trade on employment in the formal 
and informal sectors by exploiting a natural experiment from Cambodia: a policy shock 
involving Cambodian garment exports to the European Union (EU). The garment industry 
is Cambodia’s largest export industry, accounting for 77.7% of total commodity exports 
in 2014 (UN COMTRADE). The EU granted Cambodia duty-free and quota-free access 
under the Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative in 2001, and then simplified the rules of 
origin (ROO) for their Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) in 2011. Under the new 
ROO, garment exporters can use imported fabric from any third country and still maintain 
preferential access to the EU. Consequently, garment exports from Cambodia to the EU 
increased sharply since 2011. As Cambodia had little effective influence on the EU’s 
reform process in the GSP ROO, this reform was an exogenous, sudden, and 
quantitatively large positive shock to the garment export industry in Cambodia, providing 
an ideal natural experiment to identify a causal impact of exports on employment. 
                                                   
1 According to ILOSTAT by the International Labour Organization, the share of informal employment 
in non-agricultural employment was 84.7% in India for 2012, and 72.5% in Indonesia and 68.2% in 
Vietnam for 2009. 
2 See World Bank (2019) for details. 
3 The World Bank’s Global Economic Prospects (2019) report advocates “addressing the challenges 
associated with informality” and promoting greater trade integration as two of three key policy goals 
for developing economies. The third policy goal is improving human capital. (World Bank, 2019, p. 
XVII). 
4 One approach is based on firm-level panel datasets (e.g., Bernard and Jensen, 1999), and another is 
an aggregate approach based on input-output tables (e.g., Feenstra and Hong, 2010; Timmer et al., 
2013; Kiyota, 2016; Sasahara, 2019). In a developing economy context, Tanaka (2019) estimates the 
causal impact of exporting on employment in Myanmar. 
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We examine the hypothesis that the EU’s reform in ROO led to a fall in production 
and trade costs for garment production in beneficiary countries after 2011, enabling these 
countries to increase employment in the garment industry through an expansion of EU-
bound garment exports. The EU’s reform also likely affected the textile industry in 
beneficiary countries. Under the new ROO, garment exporters can use the most 
competitively priced inputs from third markets, which could reduce their dependence on 
domestically produced inputs. As a result, the EU’s reform could produce a negative 
policy shock to domestic textile production through a surge of textile imports, which may 
have reduced employment in the textile industry. To identify the causal impact of these 
trade shocks on employment in the garment and textile industries, we adopt a standard 
difference-in-differences (DID) framework. Since the identification strategy relies on the 
parallel trends assumption, we check the robustness of results to differential employment 
trends in treated and control industries during a pre-treatment period. 
We further investigate whether the employment effects of trade are heterogeneous 
between the formal and informal sectors. Trade policy may have differential impacts on 
formal and informal firms because institutional barriers prevent informal firms from 
directly engaging in exporting.5 In the case of preferential market access in the EU GSP, 
exporters must obtain a certificate of origin (CO) document to certify the origin of their 
shipped products upon entering the EU markets. Since the CO document is issued only 
to legally established enterprises, preferential market access is generally open only to 
formally registered firms. To estimate heterogeneous effects, we extend the benchmark 
DID specification by including additional interaction terms with the registration status of 
individual firms. 
We exploit a unique dataset on both formal (i.e., registered) and informal (i.e., 
unregistered) establishments in Cambodia. Specifically, we use three sets of 
establishment-level data: the Establishment Listing of Cambodia (ELC) in 2009, the 
Economic Census of Cambodia (ECC) in 2011, and the Inter-censal Economic Survey of 
Cambodia (ESC) in 2014. The ELC and ECC data cover all nonfarm establishments 
across all industrial sectors in all areas of Cambodia, whereas the ESC data are a 
nationally representative survey. These surveys ask whether individual establishments 
register with the Ministry of Commerce. Unregistered economic activity is a commonly 
used definition of informality, and business registration is an objective criterion to classify 
formal and informal economic activities (Schneider and Enste, 2013). As highlighted in 
                                                   
5  Exporting goods for a commercial purpose generally requires the submission of documents, 
including customs declarations, invoices, tax registration certificates, and export licenses. To obtain 
them, it is necessary to establish a legal entity. 
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McCaig and Pavcnik (2018), the previous literature has predominantly explored trade 
effects on employment only in the formal sector due to data limitations. Our dataset is 
advantageous in that we can estimate the impact of trade on employment in both the 
formal and informal sectors at the establishment-level. 
 Our results show large positive employment effects on formal establishments in 
the garment industry, and large negative employment effects on formal establishments in 
the textile industry. We do not find any significant employment effects on informal 
establishments in these industries following the trade shock. Our benchmark estimates 
show a per-establishment employment increase of 142.7 workers (or 22.1%) in the formal 
garment industry and a corresponding decrease of 82.9 workers (or 23.6 %) in the formal 
textile industry between 2011 and 2014. These results are robust to possible differential 
employment trends in the treated and control industries and to the possible influence of 
outlier (i.e., very large or small) establishments. Placebo tests indicate that the significant 
employment changes in these two industries are not commonly observed patterns of 
employment growth in Cambodia’s development process. We examine other possible 
supply-side and demand-side explanations for our results. Additionally, we find that 
existing firms, rather than new entrants, and domestic-owned, rather than foreign-owned, 
firms are responsible for the large employment expansion in the formal garment industry. 
The positive employment effects predominantly involve female workers while the 
negative effects are significant only for male workers. 
This paper contributes to several strands of related literature. First, we add to the 
literature on export and informal employment in developing economies.6 McCaig and 
Pavcnik (2018) exploit a large export shock due to the 2001 United States-Vietnam 
Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA) to examine the impact of export markets on workers in 
formal firms and informal microenterprises.7 Using labor force surveys, they find that a 
decline in U.S. tariffs increased the share of manufacturing workers employed in the 
registered enterprises in Vietnam. In a similar line of inquiry, we exploit a large trade 
shock due to the EU’s reform in ROO and investigate the impact of trade shocks on 
employment at formal and informal firms in Cambodia. This paper is unique in that we 
use establishment-level data without any establishment-size threshold, which allow us to 
                                                   
6 A separate strand of literature examines whether import trade liberalization affects formal and 
informal jobs in a domestic labor market (e.g., Acosta and Montes-Rojas, 2014; Aleman-Castilla, 
2006; Arias et al., 2018; Bosch et al., 2012; Dix-Carneiro and Kovak, 2017; Erten et al., 2019; 
Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2003; Heid et al., 2013; Heid, 2016; Paz, 2014). For literature review, see 
Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007) and Pavcnik (2017). 
7 Fukase (2013) and McCaig (2011) examine the impact of the US-Vietnam BTA on wages and 
poverty, respectively. 
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directly measure the employment response of all individual firms to trade shocks.8 Our 
approach is consistent with firm-heterogeneity models that predict heterogeneous 
responses of individual firms to a reduction in export costs (Melitz, 2003; Aleman-
Castilla, 2006; Heid et al., 2013; Paz, 2014; Becker, 2018). These studies generally predict 
positive employment effects of trade liberalization in the formal sector, but show mixed 
results for the informal sector. These predictions are consistent with our findings. 
Second, this paper relates to the literature on the development effects of non-
reciprocal trade preferences by developed countries. These trade policies aim to foster 
industrialization and export-led growth in developing economies through preferential 
access to major export markets. Prior work assesses the utilization of trade preference 
programs (Manchin, 2006; Hakobyan, 2015), trade flows (Frazer and Van Biesebroeck, 
2010; Herz and Wagner, 2011; Gil-Pareja et al., 2014; Cipollina et al., 2017; Ito and 
Aoyagi, 2019), eligible exporters’ rents (Özden and Sharma, 2004; Olarreaga and Özden, 
2005; Cirera, 2014), export diversification (Thelle et al., 2015; Persson and Wilhelmsson, 
2016), and value addition in beneficiaries (Edwards and Lawrence, 2016). However, 
Ornelas (2016) points out weak empirical support on the effectiveness of GSP policies in 
promoting development. We contribute to demonstrate that simplifying ROO in the GSP 
program can significantly promote employment in the formal sector through an export 
expansion. 9  Additionally, prior work shows that restrictive origin requirements 
discourage trade flows (Augier et al., 2004; Anson et al., 2005; Demidova et al., 2012; 
Conconi et al, 2018), but there is little analysis on other consequences of simplifying 
ROO. We present the first formal evidence that simplifying ROO affects employment in 
a beneficiary country. 
 Finally, we add to the literature on gender effects of trade. Wood (1991) 
documented a positive association between manufacturing exports and female 
employment shares. Trade was blamed for the “feminization” and “informalization” of 
the workforce because informal employment associated with women grew faster than 
formal employment associated with men (Standing, 1989, 1999). By contrast, Tejani and 
Milberg (2016) argue that technological changes explain female employment shares in 
manufacturing export industries since the mid-1980s. We show that formal-sector 
employment gains in the garment industry are stronger for women, and formal-sector 
employment losses in the textile industry are significant only for men. Thus, we highlight 
                                                   
8 Prior works such as Nataraj (2011) and Sundaram (2015) use a repeated cross-sectional dataset on 
formal and informal firms in India, but do not analyze employment effects of trade. 
9 As a descriptive case study, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
describes the impact of GSP and the Multifiber Arrangement on employment in the Lesotho’s garment 
industry (UNCTAD, 2012). 
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differential responses of female and male employment to trade shocks. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical 
linkages between trade and employment. Section 3 describes brief histories on 
Cambodia’s garment industry and the EU’s preferential trade policies relevant to this 
industry. Section 4 explains an empirical framework to estimate the impact of trade 
shocks on employment in the formal and informal sectors. Section 5 gives data 
description. Section 6 presents the main estimation results with robustness checks. 
Section 7 explores firm and worker characteristics in the employment effects of trade. 
Finally, section 8 concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical Background 
This section briefly reviews related theoretical work on the impact of trade on labor 
markets. We highlight the importance of informality in considering labor market 
consequences of trade in developing economies. These discussions provide a motivation 
for our empirical investigation of employment effects of trade in developing economies. 
In the heterogeneous-firm model by Melitz (2003), more productive firms have lower 
marginal costs and earn higher variable profits, which enable them to pay the fixed costs 
associated with exporting. Consequently, trade liberalization induces highly productive 
firms to expand production disproportionately and the ensuing intensified product market 
competition forces the least productive firms to exit the market. With labor as the only 
factor of production in this framework, trade liberalization induces highly productive 
firms to employ more labor inputs for exporting. Meanwhile, the assumption of identical 
workers in a perfectly competitive labor market suggests that workers are paid the same 
wage in all firms and there is no unemployment. 
However, evidence of labor market frictions is widely observed. More productive 
firms often pay higher wages. Workers with similar characteristics may earn different 
wages in the same industry and some may fail to find employment. These observations 
indicate that the labor market is imperfectly competitive. Recent theoretical research 
demonstrates that the presence of labor market imperfections can interact with firm 
heterogeneity to generate new insights into the impact of trade liberalization on labor 
markets (e.g., Egger and Kreickemeier, 2009; Helpman and Itskhoki, 2010; Felbermayr 
et al., 2011; Davis and Harrigan, 2011; Helpman et al., 2017). While these models yield 
insightful predictions about the responses of workers to trade liberalization, they 
generally predict that trade liberalization would increase employment at exporting firms. 
The distinction between the formal and informal sectors is not explicitly considered 
in these heterogeneous firm trade models, but a dualistic view is crucial for investigating 
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employment in developing economies. As discussed in McCaig and Pavcnik (2018), a 
firm-heterogeneity framework focuses on product-market competition among firms with 
heterogeneous productivities, while assuming that all produced varieties are symmetric 
imperfect substitutes. This framework does not fit developing countries in which both 
formal and informal firms coexist in an industry but with a dualistic industrial structure. 
In the formal sector, highly educated entrepreneurs typically manage firms that produce 
high-quality products and services for high-income customers using modern production 
technology with skilled labor and large capital equipment. In the informal sector, 
uneducated entrepreneurs typically manage firms that produce low-quality products and 
services for low-income customers using traditional production technology with unskilled 
labor and small capital equipment (La Porta and Shleifer, 2014). Additionally, the formal 
and informal sectors are largely segregated because formal (informal) firms have more 
intensive relationships with other formal (informal) firms and only weak technological 
and production linkages exist between these sectors (Tanaka and Hashiguchi, 2020). Thus, 
a simple difference in firm productivity may not sufficiently capture the dualistic 
industrial structure in developing economies. 
The dual structure of formal and informal firms also must be acknowledged in 
examining the effects of changes in formal institutions such as trade policy. In a 
theoretical framework with firm heterogeneity, an option for exporting to a foreign market 
is generally ex-ante open for any firm, with firm selection into exporting based on 
productivity. In reality, institutional barriers are likely to prevent informal firms from 
directly engaging in exporting. Since only legally established enterprises can submit 
customs declarations and apply for preferential treatment under the EU GSP, formal firms 
should be the most directly affected by the EU’s reform in ROO. Nevertheless, there may 
be an indirect export effect on non-exporting firms through inter-firm linkages. For 
instance, garment exporters may outsource garment orders beyond their capacity to other 
domestic garment factories including informal ones. In this case, trade policy effects are 
not limited to exporting formal firms, thereby making it important to examine both formal 
and informal firms. 
Motivated by the large presence of informal activity, a growing body of work 
considers the role of the informal sector in trade liberalization (e.g., Acosta and Montes-
Rojas, 2014; Aleman-Castilla, 2006; Arias et al., 2018; Becker, 2018; Bosch et al., 2012; 
Dix-Carneiro and Kovak, 2017; Heid et al., 2013; Heid, 2016; Paz, 2014). For instance, 
Becker (2018) introduces an informal sector in the model by Egger and Kreickemeier 
(2009), which incorporates workers’ fair wage preferences in the Melitz (2003) firm-
heterogeneity trade model. While formal firms face higher fixed costs due to a registration 
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process, they gain a productivity advantage relative to informal firms because contracts 
can be enforced only in the formal sector. The productivity sorting induces the most 
productive firms to export and serve the domestic market in the formal sector while the 
least productive firms to serve the domestic market only in the informal sector. In between 
these two extremes, firms with medium-level productivity serve the domestic market only 
in the formal sector. Trade liberalization expands employment for exporting formal firms, 
but greater domestic competition forces the least productive formal firms to enter the 
informal sector and the least productive informal firms to exit. The latter two effects 
produce an ambiguous prediction of employment changes in the informal sector. 
While these theoretical studies predict positive employment effects of trade 
liberalization in the formal sector, the impact on the informal sector is not clear. While 
some studies suggest that trade liberalization increases informal employment (Heid et al., 
2013; Arias et al., 2018), others predict an employment-reducing effect of trade (Aleman-
Castilla, 2006; Paz, 2014; Heid, 2016). Since these studies rely on different theoretical 
setups and datasets for analysis, different predictions may not come as a surprise. A 
potential source of varying predictions may be different modelling approaches for the 
informal sector because informality involves complex economic activities and there is no 
widely shared consensus as to the best modeling approach. Taken together, these works 
highlight that the employment effects of trade liberalization are likely to be heterogeneous 
across formal and informal firms in developing economies. This theoretical background 
provides a motivation for investigating the impact of trade shocks in both formal and 
informal sectors. 
 
3. Rules of Origin and Garment Exports 
Our empirical strategy draws on a natural experimental setting of a positive export 
shock to Cambodian garment exports. To explain the background, this section briefly 
describes the garment industry in Cambodia and the EU’s reform processes in ROO for 
preferential market access. Finally, we discuss implications of the reform for garment 
exporting in Cambodia. 
 
3.1. Cambodia’s Garment Industry 
Cambodia’s garment manufacturing industry started to develop after the country 
obtained the most-favored-nation (MFN) status from the U.S. in 1996 and the 
generalized-system-of-preferences (GSP) status from the EU in 1997. As discussed in 
prior works such as Bargawi (2005), Asuyama et al. (2013), Asuyama and Neou (2014), 
these trade agreements encouraged foreign investors from Hong Kong, Taiwan, Malaysia, 
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and Singapore to manufacture garments in Cambodia and export to these markets. Since 
the Cambodian domestic textile industry was underdeveloped, garment factories typically 
specialized in cut, make and trim tasks by using imported intermediate inputs such as 
yarn, fabric, and accessories. These inputs were primarily imported from China, Taiwan, 
Hong Kong, South Korea, and ASEAN markets. 
An investment framework favorable to foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows has 
also contributed to the rapid development of the garment industry. In general, there are 
few restrictions on foreign ownership and profits expatriation, although there is a 
restriction on land ownership by foreign nationals.10 Consequently, garment exports in 
HS Chapters 61 and 62 accounted for 69.3% of Cambodia’s total commodity exports in 
2000. While this share temporarily dropped to 48.8% in 2009 due to the global financial 
crisis, it quickly recovered and increased up to 77.7% in 2014 (UN COMTRADE). Thus, 
the garment industry plays the largest role in the export-oriented industrialization of the 
Cambodian economy, accounting for 5.31 billion USD in exports in 2014. 
 
3.2. The EU’s Reform in Rules of Origin 
The EU market has been a growing destination for Cambodia’s garment exports since 
Cambodia became a beneficiary country under the EBA initiative in 2001. The EU 
introduced the EBA as part of the EU GSP to grant the least-developed countries with 
duty-free and quota-free access for all tariff lines except for arms and ammunition. To 
obtain duty-free access, exporters in beneficiary countries must meet the origin-
conferring conditions under the GSP ROO. Specifically, the ROO had required that 
garment producers in Cambodia use domestically-produced fabric and/or fabric imported 
from the EU or ASEAN countries in certain conditions to qualify for duty-free access to 
the EU markets. Some Cambodian garment producers did not utilize the preferential 
access because textiles from EU and ASEAN sources were not cost effective compared 
with those from China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea (Bargawi, 2005; Yamagata, 
2006).11 Input sourcing was critical for garment production in Cambodia, as Asuyama et 
al. (2013) report that material inputs accounted for 45.6% of the gross product for garment 
firms in 2002. 
The European Commission (EC) adopted a Green Paper on ‘the future of rules of 
origin in preferential trade arrangements’ in 2003 to assess any issues with the previous 
                                                   
10 Land ownership restrictions do not act as a strong deterrent to foreign investors because foreign 
nationals are allowed to lease land and they may purchase Cambodian nationality. Consequently, 
domestic plants established by foreign investors may be reported as domestic ownership. 
11 The high costs of capital and electricity in Cambodia impede the development of the capital-
intensive textile industry. 
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ROO. The report highlights that an effective preferential trade policy needs simplification 
and relaxation of the origin rules and procedures. The EC adopted a communication on 
‘the rules of origin in preferential trade arrangements: orientations for the future’ in 2005, 
which set general principles of simplification and development-friendliness. On 
November 18, 2010, the EC adopted a new regulation on the ROO for the EU GSP, which 
became effective on January 1, 2011.12  
There was a critical change in origin requirements for garment products under the 
new ROO. To meet the product-specific origin requirements, garment producers must 
manufacture garments from fabric in a beneficiary country, thereby allowing for the use 
of imported fabric produced anywhere. The origin requirement was relaxed from two-
stage to one-stage processing. These changes had significant implications for garment 
producers in Cambodia, because the domestic textile industry was largely underdeveloped. 
Additionally, Cambodia had no direct influence in determining specific revisions 
applicable to the EU GSP. According to Inama (2011), the EC proposed a value-added 
criterion in the origin-determining criteria as a method to evaluate sufficient processing 
across the board for most products. However, this proposal met strong opposition by the 
consulted European Federations representing agricultural and industrial interests, 
resulting in a series of internal debates for a prolonged period. The EC’s consultative 
process for changing the ROO was strongly influenced by EU stakeholders (e.g., EU 
members, European industry representatives), whereas beneficiary country 
representatives did not yield any real influence. For these reasons, it is reasonable to 
consider that the EU’s reform is largely an exogenous policy change for the garment 
industry in Cambodia. 
 
3.3. Liberal Rules of Origin and Garment Exports 
We turn to discuss how the EU’s reform in ROO promotes garment exports in 
Cambodia from a theoretical point of view, with descriptive evidence of garment exports. 
Since this paper focuses on a linkage between exports and employment, we do not aim to 
establish a causal relationship between ROO and exports in this section.13 
Limited domestic textile production in Cambodia suggests that the previous origin 
requirements before the EU’s reform should be binding for garment exporters to qualify 
for preferential access because they could not use the most competitively priced inputs 
                                                   
12 For details, see Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1063/2010 of 18 November 2010 amending 
Regulation (EEC) No. 2454/93 laying down provisions for the implementation of Council Regulation 
(EEC) No. 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs Code. Inama (2011) discusses major 
changes in the new regulation. 
13 A formal assessment of the policy impacts is provided in Tanaka (2020) 
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from third markets. As discussed in Krishna (2006), binding ROO constrain the choice of 
inputs used in garment manufacture. If there is no restriction on the choice of inputs, 
garment manufacturers would use the best mix of inputs to minimize production costs. 
By restricting the use of inputs, the unit cost of production increases with the 
restrictiveness of the origin requirements. Additionally, garment exporters must obtain a 
CO document to prove that their garment products satisfy the specific origin requirements. 
This procedure involves documentation of sourcing to keep track of the origin of inputs 
and their usage, thereby increasing the production costs. 
In the case of binding ROO, the decision to export to EU markets under preferential 
treatment depends not only on the costs of meeting ROO, but on the margin of preference 
for garment products in the EU markets (i.e., the difference between the most-favored-
nation (MFN) rate of duty and the preferential rate of duty). The average tariff rate on 
clothing products in the EU is 12%, so that duty-free access implies a preferential margin 
of 12%. As is analyzed in Demidova et al. (2012), exporters can simply pay the MFN 
tariff to export to the EU markets, and thus do not need to incur the costs of meeting ROO. 
Alternatively, they can incur the costs of meeting ROO in order to benefit from the 
preferential margin. By lowering the costs of meeting ROO, the EU’s policy change 
should induce a higher fraction of potential exporters to use preferential access rather than 
pay the MFN tariff. 
To illustrate the impact of the simplified ROO on Cambodia’s garment exports, Figure 
1 presents the trends in EU garment imports from Cambodia at the quarterly level for the 
years 2007-2015. Separate trend lines indicate garment imports (i.e., in HS Chapters 61 
and 62) entering the EU under duty-free or MFN rates, based on EUROSTAT data. Duty-
free imports remain similar in nominal value for 2007-2010, but exhibit a clear upward 
trend from 2011, after the new ROO became effective. Meanwhile, MFN imports 
remained similar in value during the entire period, with no clear change after 2011. While 
a sharp increase in the duty-free imports could be driven by unobserved positive shocks 
to garment imports in the EU markets, the trend in MFN imports do not suggest that such 
unobserved shocks occurred only after 2011. Thus, it is reasonable to argue that a sharp 
increase in duty-free imports is driven primarily by the policy change in the EU ROO for 
EBA beneficiaries.14 
---Figure 1 here--- 
A plausible concern is that a sharp increase in EU imports might be due to unobserved 
                                                   
14 The main channel is that garment exporters can use the most competitively priced inputs from third 
markets. Appendix Figure 1 shows that fabric imports in Cambodia from China increased sharply after 
2011, consistent with the prediction of simplifying ROO for garment production. 
14 
 
positive shocks to garment production in Cambodia. For instance, there might be a change 
in domestic policies to support the garment industry, which promoted garment exports to 
any foreign market. To examine this issue, Figure 2 shows garment export trends for 
Cambodia. Based on the UN COMTRADE database, we show the nominal value of 
exports in HS Chapters 61 and 62 in log scale for the period 2005-2015. Since the U.S. 
had been Cambodia’s largest export market, we show trends in exports to the EU and U.S. 
Figure 2 clearly shows a sharp increase in garment exports to the EU after 2011 while 
exports to the U.S. remain largely similar in magnitude throughout the period. No 
apparent change in U.S.-bound exports after 2011 implies that unobserved domestic 
production shocks did not drive the sharp increase in EU-bound exports after 2011. 
Additionally, EU-bound exports increased so rapidly after 2011 that they went from being 
only 38.8% of U.S.-bound exports in 2010 to exceeding U.S.-bound exports by 18.7% in 
2014. These findings support a substantial impact of the EU’s reform on garment 
exporting in Cambodia. 
---Figure 2 here--- 
 
4. Empirical Framework 
As described in the previous section, the EU’s reform in ROO provides an ideal 
natural experiment to identify a causal impact of trade on employment. Specifically, the 
trade shock should increase the demand for garment production after 2011, thereby 
leading to an increase in employment for the garment industry. Meanwhile, garment 
exporters can use the most competitively priced inputs from third markets after 
simplifying origin requirements, which would reduce the dependence of garment 
producers on domestically produced inputs. As a result, the EU’s reform should produce 
a negative policy shock to domestic textile production through a surge of textile imports, 
which may reduce employment in the textile industry. 
 
4.1. Benchmark Model 
To examine these predictions, we estimate the following specification for firm i, 
industry s, region r, and year t: 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽1𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋′𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜋𝜋 + 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 + 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
 (1) 
where 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the total number of workers in firm i, including both employers and 
employees.15 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 is a dummy variable that takes on unity for the garment industry, and 
                                                   
15 In our dataset, the workers include self-employed proprietors, unpaid family workers, regular 
employees, and temporarily employed workers. Both Cambodian and foreigner workers are included. 
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zero otherwise; 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 is a dummy variable that takes on unity for the textile industry, and 
zero otherwise.16 Since we use repeated cross-section data at the firm-level for 2009, 
2011, and 2014, we define the year 2014 as the post-reform period.17 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 takes on unity 
for 2014, and zero otherwise. 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a dummy variable that takes on unity for firm i 
with a formal registration in year t, and zero otherwise. 𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the statutory minimum 
wage in Cambodia, which applies only to textile, garment, and footwear industries.18 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
represents the basic characteristics of firm i (i.e., the gender of the firm representative,19 
the ownership type and establishment type). Fixed effects, 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖  and 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, are included to 
control for time-invariant industry effects and time-varying regional effects, respectively. 
Finally, 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is an error term. 
The coefficients of interest are 𝛽𝛽1 and 𝛽𝛽2 . These coefficients should capture the 
impact of trade measured by a relative change in the average number of workers at the 
establishment level for the garment and textile industries during the post-reform period, 
respectively. Since a positive export shock should encourage garment production, we 
predict that the coefficient 𝛽𝛽1  is positive in sign. Meanwhile, a negative shock to 
domestic textile production implies that the coefficient 𝛽𝛽2 is negative in sign. Estimating 
equation (1) allows us to measure the actual magnitudes of these impacts. 
The empirical specification in equation (1) is a standard difference-in-differences 
(DID) method to identify the causal impact of a trade shock to employment. In terms of 
a garment-specific export shock, we exploit two sources of variation in employment: (i) 
a difference in employment between garment and non-garment industries, and (ii) a 
difference in employment between pre- and post-periods. The identification strategy 
relies on the parallel trends assumption that employment in both garment and non-
garment industries would exhibit similar trends in the absence of the trade shock after 
2011. If employment trends are different between the garment and non-garment industries 
in the absence of the trade shock, we may not be able to use the employment trend in the 
non-garment industries as a valid counterfactual trend for the garment industry that would 
have prevailed in the absence of the trade shock. In section 6, we check this assumption 
                                                   
16 Textile and garment industries correspond to the codes 13 and 14 in the International Standard 
Industry Classification (ISIC), Revision 4, respectively. 
17 Since the EU’s reform in ROO became effective on January 1, 2011, one may argue that the year 
2011 should delineate the post-reform period. We take the year 2011 as a pre-reform period because 
the ECC 2011 surveyed economic activities during February 2011 and Figure 1 shows no apparent 
sharp increase in garment imports for the first quarter of 2011. If employment in February 2011 was 
partially affected by the reform, there may be a downward bias in our estimates of trade impacts. 
18 The minimum wage increased from 50 USD in April 2008 to 61 USD in October 2010 and 100 
USD in February 2014. Because the statutory minimum wage is not applied to the other industries, we 
set a value of zero for them. 
19 The firm representative is the owner or chief executive officer. 
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by using a restricted sample of non-garment industries with employment trends similar to 
the garment industry during the pre-reform periods. 
In estimating equation (1), there may be a sampling bias as the 2014 dataset is a 
nationally representative survey based on sampling. Specifically, all establishments with 
50 workers or more were surveyed, whereas a stratified multistage sampling method was 
used to survey smaller establishments. More details on the survey sampling is given in 
Appendix A. This sampling scheme will naturally lead to an increase in the average firm-
level employment size for 2014 as compared to the years 2009 and 2011 because smaller 
establishments were systematically under-sampled in 2014. In our specification, the time-
varying region effects should absorb the aggregate sampling bias. Additionally, the 
sampling is designed to remove any industry bias by systematically sampling smaller 
establishments across industries. This ensures that systematic under-sampling of smaller 
establishments will not lead to an increase in the average employment size for specific 
industries in 2014. Nevertheless, there may remain a possible sampling bias empirically. 
Thus, we use the sampling weights in the ESC 2014 data to weight observations in 2014 
(Bollen et al., 2016).20 
 
4.2. Triple-Differences Model 
As discussed previously, the distinction between the formal and informal sectors is 
crucial to investigate employment effects of trade in developing economies. In equation 
(1), the coefficients 𝛽𝛽1  and 𝛽𝛽2  measure the overall net impact of trade on total 
employment (i.e., in both formal and informal sectors) for the garment and textile 
industries, respectively. The estimated impacts may mask varying effects of trade on 
employment between the formal and informal sectors. Additionally, a DID method 
assumes that there is no interference between units (Rosenbaum, 2007). In equation (1), 
we implicitly assume that the impact of the EU’s reform on the garment industry did not 
affect non-garment industries, implying that new employment opportunities in garment 
factories had little influence on employment in other industries in the wake of the reform. 
However, the EU’s reform might cause a negative shock to domestic textile production 
and a flow of workers from textile to garment factories. If there were substitution effects 
of employment between these industries, new employment in the garment industry may 
partly originate from displaced workers in the textile industry. Thus, we should exclude 
the textile industry from the sample in estimating export effects on garment workers, 
                                                   
20 An alternative approach may be to restrict the entire sample to establishments with over 50 persons 
employed. However, a substantial number of small informal establishments are removed from the 
sample in this case, which may cause a serious selection bias. 
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whereas we should drop the garment industry when estimating import effects on textile 
workers. 
To distinguish export effects on formal versus informal firms, we extend equation (1) 
by including interaction terms with the registration status of firm i: 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛿𝛿1𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿2𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 × 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖+𝛿𝛿3𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 × 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿4𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿5𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖+𝛿𝛿6𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋′𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜋𝜋 + 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 + 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   (2) 
where the variable 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 × 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 takes on unity for formally registered firms in the 
garment industry during the post-reform period. Equation (2) allows for differential 
impacts of export shocks between formally registered and informal (i.e., unregistered) 
firms. We can interpret the triple interaction term as measuring the post-reform change 
for the formal garment firms after netting out the post-reform change in all of the control 
industries and the post-reform change in the informal garment firms. Specifically, the 
coefficients 𝛿𝛿1  and 𝛿𝛿2  measure the impact of export shocks on employment for 
informal and formal firms in the garment industry, respectively. Since formal garment 
firms are fully exposed to export shocks, the coefficient 𝛿𝛿2 should be positive in sign. 
Meanwhile, informal garment firms are not directly exposed, implying that the coefficient 
𝛿𝛿1 may not be positive. Additionally, we restrict the control group to non-garment and 
non-textile industries to mitigate any substitution effects of employment between garment 
and textile industries. 
To estimate import effects on formal versus informal firms in the textile industry, we 
specify the following model: 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜆𝜆1𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆2𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 × 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆3𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 × 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆4𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆5𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖+𝜆𝜆6𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋′𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜋𝜋 + 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 + 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   (3) 
where the variable 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 × 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 takes on unity for formally registered firms in the 
textile industry during the post-reform period. The coefficients 𝜆𝜆1 and 𝜆𝜆2 measure the 
impact of import shocks on employment for informal and formal firms in the textile 
industry, respectively. We predict that the import shocks are more likely to influence 
formal textile factories that tend to supply inputs to formal garment factories (Natsuda et 
al., 2010). If such a negative shock is quantitatively large, the coefficient 𝜆𝜆2 should be 
negative. 21  Meanwhile, informal textile producers are unlikely to supply to formal 
garment factories, implying that the coefficient 𝜆𝜆1 should not be statistically different 
from zero.22 Finally, we exclude the garment industry in estimating equation (3). 
 
                                                   
21 An expansion of garment exports may also increase a demand for local textile inputs. If these 
opposite effects offset each other, the predicted sign of the coefficient 𝛿𝛿4 may not be clear. 
22 For informal textile production in developing economies, Ohno (2020) provides a case study from 
Laos. 
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5. Data Description 
5.1. Data Sources 
We construct a main dataset from the Establishment Listing of Cambodia (ELC) in 
2009, the Economic Census of Cambodia (ECC) in 2011, and the Inter-censal Economic 
Survey of Cambodia (ESC) in 2014. These surveys were mainly funded by Japanese 
official development assistance and implemented by the National Institute of Statistics 
(NIS) in the Cambodian Ministry of Planning, in cooperation with the Japan International 
Cooperation Agency. The main purpose of the project is to survey economic activities of 
all nonfarm establishments and enterprises over the entire territory of Cambodia. The 
administrative geographic units surveyed include 1,621 communes in 24 provinces as of 
2011. In preparing for the ECC, the NIS made the establishment listing in Phnom Penh 
for 2006 and conducted the establishment survey in Phnom Penh for 2007. A nation-wide 
establishment listing was made for 2009, followed by the first economic census in 2011. 
Finally, a nationally representative survey was conducted in 2014. 
The survey defines an establishment as a unit of economic entity managed by a single 
owner in a single physical location with some durable facilities. In the ELC and ECC, the 
enumeration was conducted to survey all the establishments and enterprises, including 
street vendors that operate at a fixed location but can move. To collect the data, census 
enumerators visited each establishment to interview its representative and/or owner. 
Through face-to-face interviews, the enumerators filled out a questionnaire for each 
establishment. The NIS collected all the questionnaires for data input and checked data 
consistency by comparing two data files that were made separately by two data-input 
operators. Additionally, the survey does not cover the establishments classified into (1) 
agriculture, forestry, and fishing, (2) public administration and defense, (3) activities of 
households as employers, (4) activities of extraterritorial organizations and bodies, and 
(5) mobile establishments such as bike taxis and street peddlers. Finally, each 
establishment is asked whether it registers with the Ministry of Commerce or the 
Provincial Department of Commerce. We exploit the registration question to define the 
formal sector as the business activities of registered establishments and the informal 
sector as those of unregistered establishments.23 
 
                                                   
23 To register an enterprise, firms are required to (i) provide the registrar with the specific location of 
their office and the name of their agent; (ii) deposit the legally-required initial capital in a bank and 
obtain deposit evidence; (iii) conduct an initial check of the uniqueness of the company name at the 
Intellectual Property Department and the Business Registration Office, and (ⅳ) publish an abstract of 
the company organization documents and incorporate the company with the Business Registration 
Department in the Ministry of Commerce. 
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5.2. Industry Characteristics 
Table 1 presents the main industry characteristics based on the ECC 2011. There were 
15,560 informal establishments and 398 formal establishments in the garment industry. 
The informal establishments had monthly sales of 6.03 million USD, monthly wages of 
0.55 million USD, and employment of 37,566 persons. Meanwhile, the formal 
establishments had monthly sales of 8.32 million USD, wages of 2.85 million USD, and 
employment of 256,867 persons. The per-firm average sales, wages, and employment 
were 387 USD, 35 USD, and 2.4 persons for the informal establishments. The 
corresponding figures for the formal establishments were 20,897 USD, 7168 USD, and 
645 persons. Thus, there coexist a large number of small-scale informal establishments 
and a tiny number of large-scale formal establishments. We also find a similar structure 
in the textile industry. 
---Table 1 here--- 
Formal establishments in the garment industry accounted for a significant share of 
formal manufacturing activities in Cambodia with 39.8% of sales, 68.2% of wages, and 
71.7% of employment. On the other hand, formal establishments in the textile industry 
accounted for only 4.5% of sales, 5.6% of wages, and 5.6% of employment in formal 
manufacturing. These figures indicate the large role of formal garment factories in the 
Cambodian economy even before the EU’s reform in ROO had an effect. Additionally, 
formal garment establishments hired 72.1% of regular employees and 76.6% of female 
employees in formal manufacturing. The formal garment factories contribute 
substantially to formal employment opportunities for female workers in Cambodia. 
Table 2 presents the number of establishments and workers in the garment and textile 
industries for the three years in our dataset.24 In the garment industry, the average number 
of workers in formal establishments increased from 645.4 persons in 2011 to 923.5 
persons in 2014. The total number of these workers increased from 256,867 persons to an 
estimate of 276,169 persons in 2014, with a net gain of 19,302 workers. These patterns 
are consistent with a positive trade shock of the EU’s reform on employment in the formal 
garment industry, supporting an important role of formal garment factories in aggregate 
employment growth for the Cambodian economy. In the textile industry, the average 
number of workers for formal establishments decreased from 350.3 persons in 2011 to 
270.9 persons in 2014. The total number of these workers decreased from 19,966 persons 
to an estimate of 4,954 persons in 2014. The estimated loss of 15,012 jobs in the formal 
                                                   
24 Since the ESC 2014 is based on a sampling design with a threshold of establishments with 50 
workers or more, the number of informal establishments in 2014 is substantially smaller compared 
with the data for 2009 and 2011. 
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textile industry is consistent with a negative trade shock on the textile industry through 
import competition. 
---Table 2 here--- 
The informal sector of both industries experienced job losses between 2011 and 2014 
with 9,216 jobs lost in the informal garment industry and 4,638 jobs lost in the informal 
textile industry. These job losses may reflect a flow of workers from the informal sector 
to the formal sector, a typical pattern for a developing economy. The aggregate changes 
in industry employment are consistent with trade liberalization-induced job growth in the 
formal sector of the country’s comparative advantage industry (i.e., garments) and job 
reduction in the formal sector of the country’s comparative disadvantage industry (i.e., 
textiles). We proceed to examine how employment trends differed for these two industries 
relative to other Cambodian industries over our study period. 
 
6. Estimation Results 
6.1. Main Results 
Table 3 presents the summary statistics of our establishment-level dataset. The sample 
includes 893,859 establishments in total. The total number of workers per establishment 
has a mean of 4.00 and a standard deviation of 48.6. Only 3.1% of establishments have a 
formal registration with the Ministry of Commerce. Female representatives led 58.7% of 
establishments. In terms of ownership status and establishment type, 95.5% of 
establishments are an individual proprietor and 98.3% are single unit. Thus, the vast 
majority of establishments in the sample are unregistered (i.e., informal), self-employed, 
and operated as a single unit. 
---Tables 3 and 4 here--- 
Table 4 shows benchmark results, with standard errors clustered in two ways at the 
industry-level as well as at the commune-level (Cameron et al., 2011). Column (1) reports 
the results of equation (1). The coefficients of 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 and 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 are not significant, 
suggesting that the total number of workers did not change significantly on average in the 
garment and textile industries for 2014.25 While these results suggest that the overall net 
impact of trade shocks might be negligibly small, these estimated impacts may mask 
heterogeneous effects between the formal and informal sectors. 
Column (2) shows the results of equation (2). The coefficient of 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 remains 
insignificant, suggesting that employment effects of trade are small for informal garment 
establishments. By contrast, the coefficient of 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 × 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 is significant, positive, 
                                                   
25 These coefficients remain insignificant even if we estimate each industry’s coefficient separately 
while excluding the other industry. 
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and large in magnitude, suggesting that the total number of workers increased by 142.7 
workers on average for formal garment establishments in 2014. Additionally, column (3) 
shows that the coefficient of 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 remains insignificant, implying little trade impact 
on informal textile establishments. In contrast, the coefficient of 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 × 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  is 
negative and significant, implying that the total number of workers decreased by 82.9 
workers on average for formal textile establishments in 2014. Finally, the coefficient of 
formal registration tends to be significant and positive, whereas the coefficient of 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ×
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  is not significant in columns (2) and (3). Thus, formal establishments had a 
significantly larger number of workers, but did not exhibit any significant change in 2014. 
We briefly discuss the results for control variables. The coefficient of minimum wage 
is not significant. The coefficient of female representative is not significant, indicating no 
significant difference in the employment size between male and female representative 
firms. 26  The other control variables on legal status and establishment type have 
coefficients with the expected signs. 
 
6.2. Robustness Checks 
We proceed to conduct robustness checks. First, the DID identification strategy relies 
on the parallel trends assumption that employment in both garment and non-garment 
industries would exhibit similar trends in the absence of a trade shock after 2011. To check 
whether the main results are robust to this assumption, we estimate the model for a control 
group of non-garment industries that exhibited employment trends similar to the garment 
industry during the pre-reform periods. By focusing on control industries with similar 
employment changes, we can mitigate a possible bias arising from differential 
employment trends between the garment and control industries. Specifically, we calculate 
industry-level employment changes between 2009 and 2011 for all 80 industries in our 
sample.27 By computing the absolute difference in industry-level employment changes 
between the garment industry and other industries, we can rank the non-garment 
industries according to this differential and restrict the sample to the control industries 
with more similar employment changes in the pre-reform period. 
Table 5 shows the results for control industries with similar employment trends. A 
lower percentile indicates a more similar employment change between non-garment and 
garment industries in the sample. For the 25th percentile industry sample, column (1) 
shows that the coefficient of 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 is positive and significant. The coefficient of 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 ×
                                                   
26 Each establishment must provide a single “representative” as the owner or lead executive of the 
firm, and then answer a question on representative’s gender. 
27 Appendix Table 1 shows industry-level employment in 2009 and 2011. 
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𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 is also positive and significant. For the 50th percentile industry sample, column 
(2) indicates that the coefficients of 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  and 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 × 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  are positive and 
significant. For the 75th percentile industry sample, column (3) indicates that the 
coefficient of 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 is insignificant, but the coefficient of 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 × 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 remains 
positive and significant. Thus, the positive employment effects on formal garment 
factories are robust even after accounting for differential employment trends between 
garment and other industries in the sample.  
---Table 5 here--- 
To check the parallel trends assumption for the textile industry, we estimate the model 
for a control group of non-textile industries that exhibited employment trends similar to 
the textile industry during the pre-reform periods. Table 6 presents the results for control 
industries with similar employment trends. For the 25th percentile industry sample, 
column (1) shows that the coefficient of 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 is not positive. The coefficient of 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 ×
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 is negative and has a magnitude similar to our main results. However, the large 
standard error leads to statistical insignificance. For the 50th percentile industry sample, 
column (2) suggests that the coefficient of 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 is not significant, but the coefficient 
of 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 × 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 is significant and negative. For the 75th percentile industry sample, 
column (3) shows that the coefficient of 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 is insignificant, and the coefficient of 
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 × 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  remains negative and significant. Overall, the negative employment 
effects on formal textile factories tend to be robust after accounting for differential 
employment trends between textile and other industries in the sample. 
---Table 6 here--- 
Second, our results may be sensitive to a few firms with substantial employment size. 
To address this concern, we estimate the model in equation (2) for the sample excluding 
the top 1% of registered garment establishments in terms of employment. Column (1) in 
Table 7 shows that the coefficient of 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 × 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 is positive and significant. In 
column (2), we exclude the top 3% of registered garment establishments. The coefficient 
of 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 × 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 remains positive and significant. Additionally, the ELC 2009 and 
ECC 2011 are census surveys with no establishment size thresholds, implying that some 
informal garment establishments might erroneously report a formal registration in these 
census years. Including such establishments in the baseline sample may lead to 
overestimating the positive employment effects in 2014. In column (3), we exclude both 
the top and bottom 1% of formal garment establishments in 2009 and 2011. The 
coefficient of 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 × 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 remains positive and significant. Thus, our results are 
robust to possible outliers. 
---Table 7 here--- 
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Third, we also examine the same outlier issue for the textile industry, with the results 
reported in Appendix Table 2. The coefficient of 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 × 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 remains negative and 
significant for the sample excluding the top 1% of registered textile establishments. 
However, the coefficient becomes insignificant when we exclude the top 3% of registered 
textile establishments or the top/bottom 1% of registered textiles establishments in 2009 
and 2011. To account for these results, Appendix Figure 2 shows a box plot for 
employment in the registered textile establishments across years. The figure suggests that 
some large textile factories existed in 2009 and 2011, but disappeared in 2014. These 
patterns are consistent with the negative employment effects on formal textile 
establishments. However, the number of sample establishments is relatively small, 
thereby making the regression results sensitive to excluding some large textile factories. 
Finally, we address a question whether any other industry also experienced a similar 
pattern during the period. If we observe similar patterns for many industries, our estimates 
may simply capture one of the commonly observed patterns of employment growth in the 
process of economic development. To this end, we estimate fake treatment effects in other 
industries, including food, beverage, wood, and furniture manufactures, and wholesale, 
retail, and food services. We select these industries because these industries include a 
sufficiently large number of registered establishments in 2014, which allow us to estimate 
differential employment effects between the formal and informal sectors. 
Table 8 presents the results for the specification in which an interaction variable 
between treated industry dummy and year 2014 dummy is included for each 
corresponding industry. We further include the interaction, 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑢𝑢𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼 ×
𝑌𝑌𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇2014 × 𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼, to estimate a relative change in employment separately for 
the formal and informal sectors.28 The results show that the coefficients of the interaction, 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑢𝑢𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼 × 𝑌𝑌𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇2014 , are not significant for most fake-treated industries 
such as food, beverage, and furniture manufacturing industries. Meanwhile, the 
coefficients of the interaction, 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑢𝑢𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼 × 𝑌𝑌𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇2014 × 𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼 , are 
significant only for wood manufacturing.29 Thus, the relative change in employment for 
2014 is generally much smaller in magnitude for fake-treated industries, with little 
systematic differences between the formal and informal sectors. Therefore, we can 
interpret our findings on garment and textile employment as distinctive features of the 
employment changes in Cambodia. 
---Table 8 here--- 
                                                   
28 Appendix Table 3 shows the results for the specification including only the interaction variable 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑢𝑢𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼 × 𝑌𝑌𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇2014. The estimated treatment effects are generally insignificant across 
these industries. 
29 The result for the wood industry is not robust when the sample is restricted to manufacturing. 
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6.3. Unobserved Factors in Garment Industry 
The estimated effects of trade on employment might pick up unobservable factors in 
garment production, rather than capture a trade shock due to the EU’s reform in ROO. 
This is a reasonable concern because the interaction variables 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 and 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 can 
pick up any unobserved effects specific to the garment and textile industries after 2011, 
respectively. While this issue does not point to an econometric bias in the overall net 
impact on employment, the estimated employment effects may represent not only the 
trade shock, but other unobserved factors in Cambodia. 
One related supply-side factor is the gradual increase in the minimum wage for 
garment, textile, and footwear industries in Cambodia. In our estimation, we explicitly 
controlled for the minimum wage. Another factor is a growing occurrence of labor strikes 
in garment factories.30 Since there is little systematic data on the frequency of labor 
strikes in Cambodia, it is difficult to control for this factor. Our best attempt to address 
this factor is to predict a direction of bias arising from unobserved labor strikes. We 
predict that labor strikes should have a negative influence on current garment production 
and cause some uncertainty among garment buyers, which could negatively influence 
future garment orders. This in turn would discourage employment growth due to a loss of 
garment orders from foreign buyers. As a result, the measured impact of trade on garment 
employment may be underestimated since we do not control for any negative impacts of 
domestic labor strikes in this industry. Thus, we can interpret our estimates to be lower 
bounds for the causal impact of the trade shock on garment employment. 
Along the same lines, there may be unobservable demand-side factors in non-EU 
markets, suggesting that unobserved demand shocks might have led to an increase in 
garment employment in Cambodia. As shown in Figure 2, the value of Cambodia’s 
garment exports to the EU markets increased from 1.16 billion USD in 2011 to 2.16 
billion USD in 2014, whereas the value of garment exports to the non-EU markets 
increased from 2.81 billion USD to 3.15 billion USD over the same period. The export 
expansion to the EU markets is substantially larger during this period. Nevertheless, 
export growth to the non-EU markets would certainly contribute to employment growth 
for formal garment establishments in 2014. This implies that our estimate of employment 
effects in formal garment establishments would partially capture a smaller trade effect 
from the non-EU markets (i.e., an effect that is approximately one-third the size of the 
                                                   
30 Frequent worker strikes in garment factories in the 2010s were often reported in Cambodia’s media; 
for instance, see the following article in the Phnom Penh Post (accessed on June 11, 2019): 
forhttps://www.phnompenhpost.com/business/sl-factory-strikes-slow-cambodian-garment-industry. 
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EU trade effect). A simple proportional adjustment of our estimated employment effects 
can provide a reasonable estimate of the EU market effect alone. Specifically, we estimate 
that 75% of our estimated employment effects are due to the EU export shock, which 
gives us a range of 107.0 to 153.9 added workers per formal garment establishment.31 
 
6.4 Unobserved Transitions between Formal and Informal Sectors 
Our estimates of firm-level employment changes are based on repeated cross-
sectional data rather than panel data, implying that any transitions of firms from informal 
to formal status or vice versa are not explicitly accounted for in the model. However, 
unobserved transitions may influence our results. For example, if informal garment firms 
grow larger due to the export shock and become formally registered, we may 
underestimate the impacts on the informal sector by not accounting for these transitional 
effects. Similarly, if smaller, less productive formal garment firms switch into the 
informal garment sector due to intensified competition, we may overestimate 
employment effects in the informal sector. 
To check whether transitional effects are important, we matched as many firms as 
possible in the garment industry between 2011 and 2014.32 Among 57 informal firms in 
2011 that match with their status in 2014, only five informal firms became formal. In 
terms of the opposite transition, only one firm out of 92 formal firms in 2011 became 
informal in 2014. Additionally, we matched firms in the textiles industry and found only 
one of 35 informal firms in 2011 became formal in 2014, whereas no firm out of 32 formal 
firms in 2011 became informal. Thus, only a small number of informal firms changed 
from informal to formal status and the opposite transition is extremely rare, suggesting 
that transitional effects should be small. 
 
 
7. Discussions on Firm and Worker Characteristics 
Empirical analysis up to this point has demonstrated that the trade shock led to a 
substantial change in employment for formally registered establishments. We turn to 
examine firm and worker characteristics in the employment effects of trade, followed by 
discussing trade shocks for informal employment. 
 
                                                   
31  These ranges are based on the coefficients of 142.7 and 205.3 for the registered garment 
establishments in Tables 4 and 5, respectively. 
32 Using the geographic information and the serial number of establishments in each enumeration area 
(EAs), we generate a unique identification number and link individual establishments in the same EAs 
between 2011 and 2014. 
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7.1. Impacts on Existing Establishments and New Entrants 
We measure the benchmark employment effects by using both existing establishments 
before 2012 and new start-up establishments after 2012. If the positive employment 
effects were due to large entrants after 2012, existing establishments might not have 
expanded employment. To address this issue, we estimate the model by excluding the 
start-up establishments in the year 2014 data. Table 9 presents the results for existing 
establishments.33 Column (1) shows that the coefficients of 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 and 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 are 
not significant. In column (2), the coefficient of 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 × 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 is strongly significant, 
positive, and larger in magnitude than our previous estimates. The total number of 
workers per establishment increased by 239.4 workers for registered garment 
establishments in 2014, implying that existing establishments contributed greatly to the 
employment expansion. In column (3), the coefficient of 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 × 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 is negative and 
strongly significant, suggesting that the total number of workers per establishment 
decreased by 89.5 workers for registered textile establishments in 2014. Thus, textile 
establishments existing before 2014 played a large role in the negative employment 
effects. 
---Table 9 here--- 
A related question is whether new registered entrants increased in the garment 
industry or decreased in the textile industry after 2012. Using the 2014 data, we estimate 
the probability that an establishment started a business after 2012. Column (1) of Table 
10 shows the result for a linear probability model including establishment characteristics, 
industry-level fixed effects, and commune-level fixed effects. The coefficient of the 
interaction between a garment-industry dummy variable and formal registration is not 
significant, implying that formal garment establishments do not differ significantly from 
other industries in terms of entry timing. By contrast, the coefficient of the interaction for 
the textile industry is significant and positive, suggesting that formal textile 
establishments have a higher probability of entry after 2012. This finding combined with 
earlier results suggests that new entry of formal textile establishments did not offset the 
large employment loss due to the shrinkage and/or exit of existing large textile factories. 
---Table 10 here--- 
We also examine the extent to which the employment size differs between existing 
establishments and new entrants in 2014. Using the 2014 data, we estimate the model by 
including interaction terms, 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 × 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 × 𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 and 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 × 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 × 𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 . Column (2) 
shows that the coefficient of 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 × 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 is significant and positive. The coefficient of 
                                                   
33 Appendix Table 4 presents the average number of workers for existing establishments and new 
entrants in 2014. 
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𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 × 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 × 𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 is significant and negative, suggesting that the average number of 
workers in newly registered garment entrants is smaller by 550.2 workers than that in 
existing establishments. This finding supports the important contribution of existing 
formal garment establishments in the positive employment effects. Additionally, the 
coefficient of 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 × 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖  is significant and positive, whereas the coefficient of 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 ×
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 × 𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  is not significant. Thus, newly registered entrants do not differ 
significantly in terms of workforce size from existing firms in the textile industry 
following the trade shock. 
Finally, we check whether the positive employment effect may be due to a specific 
group of foreign investors. We estimate the model by including the interaction term for 
foreign ownership.34 We report the results in Appendix Table 5.35 Across specifications, 
the coefficient of 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 × 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  remains significant and positive. By contrast, the 
interaction term for foreign ownership does not have any significant coefficients. Thus, 
there was not a significant increase in employment for foreign-owned establishments in 
the garment industry. 
 
7.2. Impacts on Male and Female Workers 
 We turn to examine worker characteristics based on gender. The summary 
statistics in Table 1 indicate that the formal garment and textiles factories predominantly 
employ female workers. The female employment share was 90.1% for formal garment 
establishments and 84.4% for formal textile establishments in 2011. Informal 
establishments in both industries employ workforces that are approximately 78% to 79% 
female. These statistics imply that trade effects on the garment and textiles industries may 
predominantly involve female workers. 
To examine disparate effects of trade on male and female workers, we estimate 
equations (2) and (3) for male and female workers separately, with the results reported in 
Table 11. In columns (1) and (3), the coefficients of 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 × 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 are significant and 
positive for both male and female workers, respectively. Registered garment 
establishments on average added 110.4 female workers and 32.3 male workers. Both 
genders experienced significant employment gains in the formal garment industry in 2014, 
with women experiencing the larger absolute gain and men experiencing the larger 
                                                   
34 Foreign-owned establishments include a foreign company’s subsidiary, branch, or commercial 
representative office. While a standard definition for foreign ownership is based on a minimum equity 
capital share held by a resident in another country, data on capital shares are not available. 
35 Since formal foreign-owned establishments in the textile industry were not observed in the 2014 
data, we cannot include the interactions, 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  , separately for domestic and foreign 
ownership for this industry. 
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percentage change (i.e., average per-firm employment growth of 50.3% for men and 
19.0% for women). Regarding the textile industry, column (2) shows that the coefficient 
of 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 × 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 is significant and negative for male workers, suggesting that the 
registered textile establishments on average employed 46.0 fewer male workers in 2014. 
Column (4) indicates an insignificant coefficient for female workers. Finally, neither 
industry shows significant gender-specific employment effects in the informal sector. 
Taken together, these results confirm that employment gains in formal establishments due 
to the trade shock involved more female workers than male workers in the garment 
industry, while employment losses were statistically significant only for male workers in 
the textiles industry. 
---Table 11 here--- 
 
8. Conclusion 
Export industries can provide formal employment opportunities to absorb a growing 
number of informal and new young workers in developing economies. This paper 
examines the relationship between trade and employment in the formal and informal 
sectors. To identify the causal impact of trade on employment, we exploit a natural 
experiment whereby the EU’s reform in the GSP ROO provided an exogenous, sudden, 
and quantitatively large positive shock to the garment export industry in Cambodia. 
Meanwhile, the EU’s reform also produced a negative policy shock to Cambodia’s textile 
production through a surge of textile imports. Using a unique dataset on both formal (i.e., 
registered) and informal (i.e., unregistered) establishments in Cambodia, we investigate 
whether the employment effects of trade are heterogeneous between the formal and 
informal sectors. 
We find that the trade shock due to the EU’s reform caused large positive employment 
effects on formal establishments in the garment industry, and large negative employment 
effects on formal establishments in the textile industry. We do not find any significant 
employment effects on informal establishments in these industries following the trade 
shock. These results are robust to possible differential employment trends in the treated 
and control industries and to the possible influence of outlier (i.e., very large or small) 
establishments. Placebo tests indicate that the significant employment changes in these 
two industries are not commonly observed patterns of employment growth in the process 
of economic development in Cambodia. Additionally, we find that locally owned 
incumbents, rather than foreign-owned firms or new entrants, are responsible for the large 
employment expansion in the formal garment industry. The positive employment effects 
predominantly involve female workers while the negative effects are significant only for 
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male workers. 
Our findings provide important implications for research on employment effects of 
trade in developing economies. First, trade shocks affect predominantly the formal sector, 
but cause little direct effects on the informal sector. Since an institutional barrier prevents 
informal firms from engaging directly in exporting, our study provides a justification for 
researchers to focus only on the formal sector in developing economies. Second, the 
employment effects of trade are heterogeneous across firms and workers. Aggregating 
heterogeneous firms and workers is likely to mask substantial heterogeneity in the 
response of firms and workers to trade shocks. It is crucial to shed light on firm and 
worker characteristics in the employment effects of trade. Additionally, this paper 
demonstrates a useful research design to address an identification issue on the trade 
impacts in developing economies. As the EU’s reform in ROO would also cause a trade 
shock in other beneficiary developing economies, it provides a unique natural experiment 
to examine trade issues in other countries. 
There remain unexplored issues for future research. First, our establishment-level 
data may miss employment adjustments in micro informal establishments through a 
shrinkage of working hours and/or by industry exit. To assess these effects, we need 
comprehensive panel data on informal firms, which are not currently available. Second, 
we do not investigate the origin of newly hired workers in the garment industry following 
a trade shock. Moving “surplus” labor (e.g., teenage girls and young women) out of 
agriculture into manufacturing is part of a standard industrialization, while shifting 
migrant workers from rural to urban areas accompanies a rapid urbanization process. We 
can shed light on this issue by using worker-level data with information on workers’ 
background. Third, we often observe that garment workers remit money out of their wage 
payments to their families in rural hometowns for food consumption, education, and 
health care. Investigating this channel can help us to assess the indirect impact of trade 
on poverty reduction in developing economies. Finally, our focus on Cambodia makes 
the question of external validity largely unexplored. Assessing other developing countries 
can shed light on the role of country heterogeneity in trade-employment linkages.
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Figure 1. Garment Imports in the EU from Cambodia 
 
Notes: The nominal value of garment imports in HS Chapters 61 and 62 eligible for duty-free 
access from Cambodia in the EU markets is shown; diamond and circle markers indicate the 
imports that entered under duty-free and MFN rates, respectively; ELC2009, ECC2011, and 
ESC2014 indicate the survey dates for the Establishment Listing in 2009, Economic Census in 
2011, and Inter-censal Economic Survey in 2014, respectively. 
Source: Authors’ calculation using EUROSTAT.
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Figure 2. Garment Export Trends for Cambodia 
 
Notes: Exports include the commodities in HS Chapters 61 and 62; the nominal value of exports 
is shown in log scale.  
Source: Authors’ calculation using UN COMTRADE.
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Table 1. Industry Characteristics in the Formal and Informal Sectors in February 2011 
Industry Garment Textile Manufacturing All 
Registration Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 
Number of establishments 15,560 398 8,862 57 69,693 1,723 487,756 17,378 
Sales (mil. USD) 6.03 8.32 1.59 0.94 32.49 20.91 459.85 140.32 
Wages (mil. USD) 0.55 2.85 0.24 0.23 2.33 4.18 20.97 14.46 
Employment 37,566 256,867 19,075 19,966 172,249 358,092 1,111,886 561,504 
 Unpaid family workers 10,074 90 5,841 7 60,742 981 336,345 8,971 
 Regular employees 11,961 256,635 4,439 19,940 42,021 355,944 299,738 542,043 
 Female employment 29,459 231,324 14,974 16,848 86,733 301,853 638,590 385,442 
Notes: Formal and informal sectors indicate formally registered and unregistered establishments under the Ministry of Commerce or Provincial 
Department of Commerce, respectively; sales and wages are a monthly figure in February 2011; all industries include (1) mining and quarrying, 
(2) manufacturing, (3) electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply, (4) water supply, (5) construction, (6) wholesale and retail trade, (7) 
transportation and storage, (8) accommodation and food service activities, (9) information and communication, (10) financial and insurance 
activities, (11) real estate activities, (12) professional, scientific and technical activities, (13) administrative and support service activities, (14) 
education, (15) human health and social work activities, (16) arts, entertainment and recreation, and (17) other service activities. 
Source: Economic Census 2011. 
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Table 2. Establishment Characteristics Across Years 
Industry Garment Textile 
Registration Informal Formal Informal Formal 
Number of establishment     
 Year 2009 9,122 303 11,281 61 
 Year 2011 15,560 398 8,862 57 
 Year 2014 277 225 100 14 
Average number of workers         
 Year 2009 3.4 773.6 2.4 266.3 
 Year 2011 2.4 645.4 2.2 350.3 
  Year 2014 5.8 923.5 3.7 270.9 
Total number of workers         
 Year 2009 31,457 234,390 27,554 16,247 
 Year 2011 37,566 256,867 19,075 19,966 
  Year 2014 a 28,350 276,169 14,437 4,954 
Notes: Formal and informal sectors indicate formally registered and unregistered 
establishments under the Ministry of Commerce or provincial department of commerce, 
respectively; (a) the total number of workers in 2014 is estimated by multiplying the 
establishment-level number of workers by corresponding sampling weights. 
Source: Establishment Listing 2009, Economic Census 2011, and Inter-censal Economic 
Survey 2014 
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Table 3. Summary Statistics of Establishment-level Data 
Variable No. of Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Total workers 893,859 4.00 48.61 1 8000 
Male workers 893,859 1.59 12.65 0 3063 
Female workers 893,859 2.41 41.65 0 7200 
Garment×Year 2014 893,859 0.0005 0.023 0 1 
Garment×Year 2014×Registration 873,484 0.0002 0.016 0 1 
Garment×Registration 873,484 0.0011 0.032 0 1 
Textile×Year 2014 893,859 0.0001 0.011 0 1 
Textile×Year 2014×Registration 867,968 0.00002 0.004 0 1 
Textile×Registration 867,968 0.0002 0.012 0 1 
Registration 893,859 0.031 0.173 0 1 
Registration×Year 2014 893,859 0.0012 0.035 0 1 
Minimum wage 893,859 2.958 12.71 0.0 100 
Female representative 893,859 0.587 0.492 0 1 
Legal status      
 Individual proprietor (base) 893,859 0.955 0.207 0 1 
 Partnership 893,859 0.002 0.047 0 1 
 Private/public company 893,859 0.007 0.085 0 1 
 Foreign owned company 893,859 0.0003 0.017 0 1 
 Cooperative 893,859 0.0003 0.017 0 1 
 State-owned organization 893,859 0.021 0.142 0 1 
 NGO 893,859 0.002 0.048 0 1 
 Other legal status 893,859 0.012 0.107 0 1 
Establishment type      
 Single unit (base) 893,859 0.983 0.128 0 1 
 Head office 893,859 0.002 0.040 0 1 
  Branch office 893,859 0.015 0.122 0 1 
Source: Establishment Listing 2009, Economic Census 2011, and Inter-censal Economic 
Survey 2014 
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Table 4. Benchmark Results 
Dependent: Total number of workers 
Variable 
(1) (2) (3) 
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Garment×Year 2014 -46.6 (80.6) -77.1 (112.9)   
Garment×Year 2014×Registration   142.7+ (77.1)   
Garment×Registration   664.8** (13.2)   
Textile×Year 2014 -44.0 (84.2)   -254.0 (207.0) 
Textile×Year 2014×Registration     -82.9** (22.1) 
Textile×Registration     280.0** (12.1) 
Registration 18.3+ (10.8) 4.07 (3.98) 6.95** (2.17) 
Registration×Year 2014   2.95 (5.58) 1.63 (3.39) 
Minimum wage 0.88 (1.89) 1.78 (2.62) 5.65 (4.61) 
Female representative -1.21 (0.91) -0.43 (0.30) -0.38 (0.24) 
Partnership 62.9 (42.6) 36.1+ (19.4) 20.6* (10.3) 
Private/public company 86.5 (60.9) 52.0+ (30.9) 26.9* (12.7) 
Foreign owned company 129.2+ (66.9) 74.2 (49.0) 85.2 (53.0) 
Cooperative 7.38 (7.15) 2.93 (5.25) 1.26 (4.45) 
State-owned organization 11.6** (3.63) 9.38* (4.18) 9.49* (3.88) 
NGO 13.8+ (7.05) 11.4* (4.83) 7.40** (2.74) 
Other legal status 2.53 (4.04) -0.097 (2.67) -0.69 (2.33) 
Head office 71.5* (28.5) 59.6** (20.8) 52.9** (17.2) 
Branch office -15.1 (14.3) -8.51 (7.78) -1.73 (2.64) 
Industry-level fixed effects Y Y Y 
Commune-year-level fixed effects Y Y Y 
No. of observations 893,859 873,484 867,968 
R-squared 0.15 0.33 0.17 
Notes: Textile and garment industries are excluded in columns (2) and (3), respectively; standard errors are clustered at the industry-level as well 
as clustered at the commune-level; each observation is weighted by sampling weights; constant is unreported; **, *, and + indicate significance 
at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 5. Results for Similar Employment Trends with Garment Industry 
Dependent: Total number of workers 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
Garment×Year 2014 17.7** 18.7** -77.1 
 (4.92) (4.93) (113.2) 
Garment×Year 2014×Registration 205.3+ 188.4+ 147.5+ 
 (103.2) (93.3) (81.3) 
Garment×Registration 664.1** 659.5** 664.7** 
 (22.1) (19.7) (14.0) 
Control variables Y Y Y 
No. of observations 624,663 659,461 853,433 
R-squared 0.39 0.38 0.34 
Sample 25th Percentile 50th Percentile 75th Percentile 
Notes: Sample includes a group of non-garment/non-textile industries as determined by the 
absolute difference in a normalized employment change from 2009 to 2011 between their and 
garment industries, with lower percentiles indicating more similar employment changes with 
the garment industry; parentheses report standard errors clustered at the industry-level as well 
as clustered at the commune-level; each observation is weighted by sampling weights; control 
variables include registration, registration×year 2014, minimum wage, representative gender, 
legal status, establishment type, industry-level fixed effects, and commune-year-level fixed 
effects; constant is unreported; **, *, and + indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
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Table 6. Results for Similar Employment Trends with Textile Industry 
Dependent: Total number of workers 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
Textile×Year 2014 -29.8 -4.45 -263.1 
 (26.8) (3.12) (212.2) 
Textile×Year 2014×Registration -86.8 -107.2** -91.0** 
 (57.2) (20.0) (20.2) 
Textile×Registration 260.9** 289.1** 274.4** 
 (38.5) (11.4) (15.4) 
Control variables Y Y Y 
No. of observations 78,968 713,508 744,594 
R-squared 0.24 0.19 0.19 
Sample 25th Percentile 50th Percentile 75th Percentile 
Notes: Sample includes a group of non-garment/non-textile industries as determined by the 
absolute difference in a normalized employment change from 2009 to 2011 between their and 
textile industries, with lower percentiles indicating more similar employment changes with 
the textile industry; parentheses report standard errors clustered at the industry-level as well 
as clustered at the commune-level; each observation is weighted by sampling weights; control 
variables include registration, registration×year 2014, minimum wage, representative gender, 
legal status, establishment type, industry-level fixed effects, and commune-year-level fixed 
effects; constant is unreported; **, *, and + indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
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Table 7. Results for Excluding Largest/Smallest Formal Garment Firms 
Dependent: Total number of workers 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
Garment×Year 2014 -79.7 -75.7 -80.8 
 (111.6) (111.6) (112.4) 
Garment×Year 2014×Registration 107.9+ 101.0+ 173.8* 
 (59.1) (54.7) (76.6) 
Garment×Registration 623.4** 560.5** 635.3** 
 (12.3) (11.2) (12.3) 
Control variables Y Y Y 
No. of observations 873,475 873,456 873,452 
R-squared 0.35 0.34 0.35 
Sample 
Exclude top 1% 
formal garment 
firms 
Exclude top 
3% formal 
garment firms 
Exclude top and 
bottom 1% 
formal garment 
firms in 2009 
and 2011 
Notes: Textile industry is excluded from the sample; parentheses report standard errors 
clustered at the industry-level as well as clustered at the commune-level; each observation is 
weighted by sampling weights; control variables include registration, registration×year 2014, 
minimum wage, representative gender, legal status, establishment type, industry-level fixed 
effects, and commune-year-level fixed effects; constant is unreported; **, *, and + indicate 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 8. Results of Fake Treatment Effects in Other Industries 
Dependent: Total number of workers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Treated Industry 
Variable Food Beverage Wood Furniture Wholesale Retail 
Food 
service 
Treated Industry×Year 2014 -0.74 -0.90 -1.40 0.051 0.14 0.35 -0.24 
 (0.80) (0.63) (1.20) (0.59) (0.50) (0.55) (0.32) 
Treated Industry×Year 2014×Registration 25.2 3.88 -56.1** 183.7 10.8 -12.7 -16.4 
 (17.1) (9.08) (21.2) (121.6) (16.4) (14.1) (16.2) 
Treated Industry×Registration -19.5 -12.5 9.91 -19.4 -29.8 -31.3 -13.9 
 (16.5) (22.4) (21.2) (13.7) (21.8) (20.4) (15.7) 
Control variables Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
No. of firms in treated industry 71,870 9,841 4,667 2,387 15,114 441,422 95,461 
No. of registered firms in treated industry 1,385 230 71 80 1,545 5,872 1,564 
No. of observations 893,859 893,859 893,859 893,859 893,859 893,859 893,859 
R-squared 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 
Notes: Parentheses report standard errors clustered at the industry-level as well as clustered at the commune-level; each observation is weighted by 
sampling weights; control variables include registration, registration×year 2014, minimum wage, representative gender, legal status, establishment 
type, industry-level fixed effects, and commune-year-level fixed effects; firms in treated industry are the total number of (possibly duplicate) firms 
in a repeated cross-section dataset; constant is unreported; **, *, and + indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 9. Results for Existing Establishments 
Dependent: Total number of workers 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
Garment×Year 2014 -23.1 -58.3  
 (63.6) (91.5)  
Garment×Year 2014×Registration  239.4**  
  (77.5)  
Garment×Registration  664.0**  
  (14.8)  
Textile×Year 2014 -29.9  -209.8 
 (67.4)  (177.6) 
Textile×Year 2014×Registration   -89.5** 
   (18.3) 
Textile×Registration   280.1** 
   (12.2) 
Control variables Y Y Y 
No. of observations 889,454 869,092 863,760 
R-squared 0.15 0.34 0.17 
Notes: We exclude the establishments that report a year of starting business after 2012; textile 
and garment industries are excluded in columns (2) and (3), respectively; parentheses report 
standard errors clustered at the industry-level as well as clustered at the commune-level; each 
observation is weighted by sampling weights; control variables include registration, 
registration×year 2014, minimum wage, representative gender, legal status, establishment 
type, industry-level fixed effects, and commune-year-level fixed effects; constant is 
unreported; **, *, and + indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 10. Results for New Entrants 
  (1) (2) 
Dependent New Entry No. of workers 
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Garment×Registration 0.10 (0.073) 1010.5** (80.7) 
Garment×Entry   0.053 (0.54) 
Garment×Registration×Entry   -550.2** (47.3) 
Textile×Registration 0.30* (0.13) 307.3** (67.3) 
Textile×Entry   5.04** (1.68) 
Textile×Registration×Entry   -4.10 (72.7) 
Registration -0.17** (0.050) 4.91 (3.17) 
Registration×Entry   -9.86+ (5.75) 
Entry   -0.13 (0.12) 
Control variables Y Y 
No. of observations 12,051 12,051 
R-squared 0.21 0.49 
Sample year 2014 2014 
Notes: New Entry is the establishments that report a year of starting business after 2012; 
parentheses report standard errors clustered at the industry-level as well as clustered at the 
commune-level; each observation is weighted by sampling weights; control variables include 
representative gender, legal status, establishment type, industry-level fixed effects, and 
commune-level fixed effects; constant is unreported; **, *, and + indicate significance at 1%, 
5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 11. Results for Male and Female Employment 
Dependent: Total number of workers by gender 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable Male worker Female worker 
Garment×Year 2014 -5.45  -71.6  
 (7.86)  (105.1)  
Garment×Year 2014×Registration 32.3+  110.4+  
 (16.6)  (61.7)  
Garment×Registration 55.2**  609.6**  
 (2.89)  (11.5)  
Textile×Year 2014  -17.1  -236.9 
  (13.9)  (193.1) 
Textile×Year 2014×Registration  -46.0**  -36.9 
  (5.74)  (23.0) 
Textile×Registration  36.9**  243.1** 
  (2.81)  (10.1) 
Control variables Y Y Y Y 
No. of observations 873,484 867,968 873,484 867,968 
R-squared 0.22 0.19 0.33 0.15 
Notes: Garment industry is excluded from the sample in columns (1) and (3); textile industry 
is excluded in columns (2) and (4); parentheses report standard errors clustered at the 
industry-level as well as clustered at the commune-level; each observation is weighted by 
sampling weights; control variables include registration, registration×year 2014, minimum 
wage, representative gender, legal status, establishment type, industry-level fixed effects, and 
commune-year-level fixed effects; constant is unreported; **, *, and + indicate significance at 
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Appendix A 
 
A1. Sampling Design in the 2014 Inter-censal Economic Survey 
According to the outline of the 2014 Inter-censal Economic Survey in Cambodia, we explain 
the sampling design as follows. In the first step, all establishments with at least 50 employees are 
selected. The sample of these establishments includes 1,619 establishments employing 508 
thousand workers. The sample accounted for 0.32% of the total number of establishments and 
30.3% of the total number of workers in the ECC 2011. 
In the second step, a stratified multistage sampling method is used to select small and micro-
scale establishment samples. First, Enumeration Areas (EAs) used in the ECC 2011 are stratified 
into three strata according to industrial characteristics. Second, 30 EAs are selected from the 6 
largest provinces, and 20 EAs are selected from the other 18 provinces. These sample EAs are 
allocated to the three strata proportionately in terms of the number of EAs in each province. In 
the end, 540 EAs are selected, accounting for around 3% of all the EAs in Cambodia. Additionally, 
up to 30 establishments are selected from each EA. 
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Appendix Figure 1. Fabric Import Trends for Cambodia 
 
Notes: Fabric indicates the commodities in HS 5208-12, 5309-11, 5407-08, 5512-16, 56, 57, 58, 
59, and 60; HKT indicates the total fabric imports from Hong Kong, South Korea, and Taiwan. 
Source: UN COMTRADE and Taiwan Trade Statistics Search. 
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Appendix Figure 2. Box Plot for Employment in the Formal Textile Establishments 
 
Source: Establishment Listing 2009, Economic Census 2011, and Inter-censal Economic Survey 
2014 
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Appendix Table 1. Industry-level Employment in 2009 and 2011 
ISIC 2009 2011 2011/2009 ISIC 2009 2011 2011/2009 
5 6 0 0.00 50 480 943 1.96 
6 22 0 0.00 51 276 879 3.18 
7 42 375 8.93 52 4,938 6,337 1.28 
8 2,612 1,594 0.61 53 162 109 0.67 
9 52 71 1.37 55 20,311 28,411 1.40 
10 110,067 68,353 0.62 56 92,781 166,876 1.80 
11 15,400 12,892 0.84 58 943 2,370 2.51 
12 4,307 2,334 0.54 59 410 300 0.73 
13 43,801 39,041 0.89 60 1,049 1,746 1.66 
14 265,847 294,433 1.11 61 6,689 10,957 1.64 
15 27,572 40,864 1.48 62 25 947 37.88 
16 8,866 7,402 0.83 63 316 269 0.85 
17 1,196 1,265 1.06 64 24,475 27,439 1.12 
18 3,456 3,800 1.10 65 174 240 1.38 
19 189 57 0.30 66 173 153 0.88 
20 1,939 9,154 4.72 68 464 1,071 2.31 
21 472 309 0.65 69 851 493 0.58 
22 899 1,236 1.37 70 123 94 0.76 
23 17,578 18,275 1.04 71 172 204 1.19 
24 391 503 1.29 72 53 67 1.26 
25 13,385 15,392 1.15 73 214 182 0.85 
26 52 15 0.29 74 2,223 2,668 1.20 
27 1,163 236 0.20 75 140 106 0.76 
28 157 119 0.76 77 11,705 14,698 1.26 
29 122 15 0.12 78 244 665 2.73 
30 1,179 1,761 1.49 79 2,043 2,839 1.39 
31 4,001 3,685 0.92 80 1,465 7,590 5.18 
32 3,444 6,807 1.98 81 378 89 0.24 
33 2,442 2,393 0.98 82 1,729 4,199 2.43 
35 14,806 14,632 0.99 85 123,325 130,356 1.06 
36 1,216 1,854 1.52 86 22,441 30,860 1.38 
38 2,463 2,336 0.95 87 1,542 2,011 1.30 
39 0 18 n.a. 88 633 305 0.48 
41 2,048 938 0.46 90 8,916 9,714 1.09 
42 625 497 0.80 91 454 527 1.16 
43 152 594 3.91 92 19,485 26,725 1.37 
45 46,350 53,264 1.15 93 1,997 3,197 1.60 
46 21,260 35,203 1.66 94 78,544 21,095 0.27 
47 364,250 465,026 1.28 95 11,480 14,390 1.25 
49 5,903 3,677 0.62 96 33,816 40,849 1.21 
Note: Garment and textile industries correspond to the codes 14 and 13, respectively. 
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Appendix Table 2. Results for Excluding Largest/Smallest Formal Textile Firms 
Dependent: Total number of workers 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
Textile×Year 2014 -249.6 -250.9 -253.5 
 (209.0) (208.4) (207.1) 
Textile×Year 2014×Registration -41.1+ 29.2 -11.5 
 (22.5) (21.8) (21.5) 
Textile×Registration 238.2** 167.5** 208.3** 
 (11.8) (8.52) (10.1) 
Control variables Y Y Y 
No. of observations 867,967 867,965 867,960 
R-squared 0.18 0.18 0.18 
Sample 
Exclude top 1% 
formal textile 
firms 
Exclude top 3% 
formal textile 
firms 
Exclude top/bottom 
1% formal textile 
firms in 2009/2011 
Notes: Garment industry is excluded from the sample; parentheses report standard errors 
clustered at the industry-level as well as clustered at the commune-level; each observation is 
weighted by sampling weights; control variables include registration, registration×year 2014, 
minimum wage, representative gender, legal status, establishment type, industry-level fixed 
effects, and commune-year-level fixed effects; constant is unreported; **, *, and + indicate 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Appendix Table 3. Results of Fake Treatment Effects in Other Industries 
Dependent: Total number of workers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Treated Industry Food Beverage Wood Furniture Wholesale Retail Food service 
Treated Industry×Year 2014 -0.27 -1.25 -1.90+ 1.27 2.45 0.36 -0.0055 
 (0.95) (1.19) (1.02) (1.10) (1.75) (0.58) (0.30) 
Registration 18.3+ 18.3+ 18.3+ 18.3+ 18.3+ 18.3+ 18.3+ 
 (10.8) (10.8) (10.8) (10.8) (10.8) (10.8) (10.8) 
Control variables Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
No. of firms in treated industry 71,870 9,841 4,667 2,387 15,114 441,422 95,461 
No. of observations 893,859 893,859 893,859 893,859 893,859 893,859 893,859 
R-squared 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 
Notes: Parentheses report standard errors clustered at the industry-level as well as clustered at the commune-level; each observation is weighted by 
sampling weights; control variables include minimum wage, representative gender, legal status, establishment type, industry-level fixed effects, 
and commune-year-level fixed effects; firms in treated industry are the total number of (possibly duplicate) firms in a repeated cross-section 
dataset; constant is unreported; **, *, and + indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Appendix Table 4. Existing Establishments and New Entrants in 2014 
Sector Informal Formal 
Industry Existing Entrant Existing Entrant 
Panel A: Total Number of Establishments 
Garment 138 139 168 57 
Textile 90 10 12 3 
Other Mfg. 730 365 155 32 
Services 5,866 3,697 616 100 
Panel B: Average Number of Workers 
Garment 6.7 4.8 1,072 497 
Textile 3.7 2.4 274 286 
Other Mfg. 4.1 2.3 484 692 
Services 10.4 3.8 144 47 
Panel C: Average Number of Male Workers 
Garment 1.3 1.1 162 80 
Textile 0.8 2.0 54 29 
Other Mfg. 2.6 1.6 175 140 
Services 5.8 1.0 85 26 
Panel D: Average Number of Female Workers 
Garment 5.4 3.8 910 417 
Textile 2.9 1.8 220 257 
Other Mfg. 1.4 0.8 309 552 
Services 4.6 1.4 59 21 
Notes: Formal and informal sectors indicate registered and unregistered establishments under 
the Ministry of Commerce or provincial department of commerce, respectively; new entrant is 
the establishments that report a starting year after 2012, and the other is existing; Other Mfg. 
does not include the garment and textile industries; Services include utilities, construction, 
distribution, transportation, accommodation, food, information, finance, real estate, and 
professional and administrative services. 
Source: Inter-censal Economic Survey 2014 
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Appendix Table 5. Results for Foreign Establishments 
Dependent: Total number of workers 
Variable (1) (2) 
Garment×Year 2014 -77.1 -78.2 
 (112.4) (88.8) 
Garment×Year 2014×Registration 131.1+ 200.5* 
 (76.6) (90.4) 
Garment×Year 2014×Foreign 361.2 -933.7 
 (398.1) (1089.0) 
Garment×Registration 670.4** 500.9** 
 (13.0) (58.4) 
Garment×Foreign -256.5** -91.4 
 (22.1) (58.8) 
Foreign×Year 2014 281.9 1395.6 
 (278.4) (1009.1) 
Control variables Y Y 
No. of observations 873,484 137,355 
R-squared 0.33 0.43 
Sample All Manufacturing 
Notes: The sample excludes textile industry; parentheses report standard errors clustered at 
the industry-level as well as clustered at the commune-level; each observation is weighted by 
sampling weights; control variables include registration, registration×year 2014, minimum 
wage, representative gender, legal status, establishment type, industry-level fixed effects, and 
commune-year-level fixed effects; constant is unreported; **, *, and + indicate significance at 
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
